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Trust and Reputation Systems constitute an essential part of many social networks due to
the great expansion of these on-line communities in the past few years. As a consequence
of this growth, some users try to disturb the normal atmosphere of these communities, or
even to take advantage of them in order to obtain some kind of benefits. Therefore, the con-
cept of trust is a key point in the performance of on-line systems such as on-line market-
places, review aggregators, social news sites, and forums. In this work we propose a
method to compute a ranking of the users in a social network, regarding their trustworthi-
ness. The aim of our method is to prevent malicious users from illicitly gaining high repu-
tation in the network by demoting them in the ranking of users. We propose a novel
system intended to propagate both positive and negative opinions of the users through a
network, in such way that the opinions from each user about others influence their global
trust score. Our proposal has been evaluated in different challenging situations. The exper-
iments include the generation of random graphs, the use of a real-world dataset extracted
from a social news site, and a combination of both a real dataset and generation tech-
niques, in order to test our proposals in different environments. The results show that
our method performs well in every situations, showing the propagation of trust and dis-
trust to be a reliable mechanism in a Trust and Reputation System.1. Introduction
The relevance of Trust and Reputation Systems (TRSs)
has grown in the past few years, in parallel to the huge
expansion of social networks. The problem of managing
the trustworthiness of the users of an on-line community
is not new, and it has been faced with diverse methods
depending on the context and the aim of the network
where it was applied. For example, in on-line forums and
social news sites is not rare to encounter a troll, that is a
user who comments contents with the aim of focusing
the attention on himself diverting the topic of discussion,
or simply to cause an argument. These networks usually
have a special group of users (moderators) who have the: +34 954557139.ability (and responsibility) of banning those users that they
consider malicious or trolls. The main benefit of this kind
of fully supervised systems is the ability of determining
whether a user is a troll or not regarding all their actions,
including their comments in the network.
On the other hand, a system based on moderators has
two main disadvantages: scalability and subjectivity. The
supervised system can be a reliable mechanism in net-
works with a medium-small number of users, but it is
not scalable to social networks with a high amount of
members and contents. Some social networks that have
adopted this kind of TRS try to overcome this problem by
delegating some of the moderation task to the users. They
are provided with a mechanism to send notifications to the
moderators whenever they detect an abusive content or
behavior in the network. This system can help the moder-
ators, but it also offers options to malicious users for
cheating the TRS in other ways. Concerning the subjectivity
problem, the decisions about whether a user is a troll or
not, or whether a comment is a controversial contribution
to a discussion or just trolling, depends on the judgment of
the moderators.
Other systems provide all the users with the ability of
giving their opinions about other users, or even the con-
tents generated by them. These voting systems are decen-
tralized, so they avoid the subjectivity problem by
delegating the decision to all the users of the network,
and also the scalability issue because there is not an
authority (or a group of them) that has to make all the
decisions. There exist different techniques that processes
this information together with the topology of the network
of relationships formed by the users in order to propagate
their opinions through the system with the aim of comput-
ing a trust score for each user.
In this work, we propose a novel approach to this prob-
lem, defining a general method that propagates not only
the positive opinions of the users in a social network, but
also the negative opinions. This is important due to the
existence of several social networks where negative opin-
ions are as determining as the positive ones or even more,
such as in on-line marketplaces where the potential buyers
not only evaluate the price of a product but also the repu-
tation of the seller. In this case, a negative feedback from a
customer can strongly influence the decisions of other
users about that seller. The negative opinions are also
important in other social networks, such as review aggre-
gators, social news sites and recommender systems.
Our approach is intended to build a ranking of users
according to their trustworthiness, demoting the users
who present a dishonest behavior in the system. Our ap-
proach also avoids the negative effects that the actions of
these malicious users can cause in the reputation of other
users in the network. Unlike other proposed methods, in
our proposal both positive and negative information are
propagated in order to evaluate the scores of each user,
being able to capture the transitivity of trust and distrust
in a social network.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2
we briefly talk about other works on trust and reputation
analysis. Section 3 introduces our approach. The design
and the results of the experiments performed to test our
approaches are shown in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Fi-
nally, in Section 6 we point out the conclusions and future
work on this field.1 trust.mindswap.org/FilmTrust.2. Related work
Several works about TRS’s have been carried out, study-
ing the challenges that these systems must face in order to
provide the users of social networks with reliable informa-
tion about the trustworthiness of the rest of the users in
the system. Common problems in the implementation of
TRS in a social network are discussed in [1,2]. They point
out the existence of a bias in the majority of the ratings to-
ward giving positive or negative scores, depending on the
topic of the network. They also talk about the absence of
incentives that users usually have for providing reviewsin the system. These incentives can consist in an improved
service, such as a higher download rate in the case of
streaming services or even economic rewards in the case
of on-line marketplaces.
Other works study the nature of the relationships in a
specific social network, and then propose methods in-
tended to deal with them. This is useful in order to capture
the different meanings of the relationships that can be
established in each social network. For example, in those
social networks where users usually provide each other
with positive ratings as an expression of politeness, such
as positively commenting back a positive review on eBay,
or following back a new follower in Twitter. This phenom-
enon is called nepotistic relationships and it can be used for
malicious users in order to gain a high number of followers
by following a huge number of users who (hopefully) will
follow them back. It is taken into account by some works
[3,4] when it comes to compute the reputation of the users
in those networks.
There exist in the bibliography several propagation
algorithms intended to compute the trustworthiness of
the users in a social network. One of the first works on this
task was the EigenTrust algorithm [12], that aims to reduce
the number of inauthentic file downloads in a P2P net-
work. In the EigenTrust algorithm, each user calculates
the local trust value for all peers voting to him. The global
trust value is obtained by aggregating the normalized local
trust values with respect to a peer. EigenTrust claims to
take into account both positive and negative feedback from
the users, but it actually assigns a trust score of 0 to every
user whose local trust score is negative. So the algorithm
only works with graphs whose edges have always positive
weights.
Other technique that only works with positively
weighted graphs is TidalTrust [19], a proposal intended
to measure the trust between two users in a social net-
work. It processes the trust graph, constructed by the rela-
tions between users. The algorithm computes the trust
score for each pair of users, tu;v , relying on the direct expe-
rience of all the nodes that constitute the shortest path
from u to v in the network of trust. The algorithm follows
the Eq. (1), to recursively compute the trust between u







where  is the threshold that limits the strength of the
paths to be considered. The strength of a path fa; b; cg is
computed as the minimum between the rating between a
and b and the rating between b and c. In the cited work
they show the performance of the algorithm using a data-
set extracted from FilmTrust,1 a social network formed by a
system for user-generated movies reviews and a recom-
mender system. The recommendation of movies is based
on the combination of the user’s trust network and the mo-




Fig. 1. Transitivity models: (1) Multiplicative distrust. (2) Additive distrust.
(3) Neutral distrust. Dashed lines corresponds to negative opinions, while
thick lines are positive votes, and thin ones are undecided opinions.PowerTrust [18] is a TRS that aggregates the positive
and negative opinions between the users into the local trust
scores, similarly to EigenTrust. These scores are propagated
through the network by a random-walk algorithm in order
to obtain the global trust scores for each user in the net-
work. The novelty in this system is that it establishes a
method intended to select a set of power peers. The opin-
ions from these users will be propagated through the net-
work with more strength than the opinions from the rest of
users. This method has the advantage of automatizing this
process, but it presents a major disadvantage: since it is an
unsupervised process, it is susceptible to being used by
malicious users for their benefits, so it constitutes a poten-
tial weak point in the TRS.
In [9], the concept of transitivity of distrust is introduced,
representing the way in which negative opinions of users
can be spread over the social network. There are different
assumptions that can be adopted when we try to estimate
the trustworthiness of a node in a network, depending on
the transitivity of distrust. The multiplicative distrust fol-
lows the assumption of ‘‘The enemy of my enemy is my
friend’’, it implies that if user a distrusts b, and b distrusts
c, then a trusts c. In an additive distrust model, given the
previous example, a should strongly distrust c, because c
is not respected by b. In other words: ‘‘Don’t respect some-
one not respected by someone you don’t respect’’. Finally, the
neutral distrust can be stated as: ‘‘Don’t take into account
your enemies’ opinions’’. It implies that if a distrust b, then
we cannot make any inference for neighbors of node b.
The transitivity models are graphically represented in
Fig. 1. The dashed lines represent distrust between the re-
lated nodes, the thick edges represent trust, and the thin
solid ones are undetermined relations.
Other work that studies a social network with positive
and negative opinions is presented in [10]. They analyze
the trust and reputation mechanism in Slashdot.org, where
users can establish relations of friend or foe with other
users in the network. They prove the multiplicative dis-
trust transitivity model of this kind of networks. Further-
more, taking the network as dataset, some centrality
measures are compared with the two proposals of the pa-
per, Signed Spectral Ranking and Negative Ranking which
take into account positive and negative opinions in the so-
cial network. Both techniques present a very good perfor-
mance in this task, although they do not take into
account the effects of the transitivity of distrust.On the other hand, there are also many works that ana-
lyze the risks and difficulties of TRS’s. A set of common
security vulnerabilities for TRS’s are identified in [7,8]:
the initial window problem (or cold start) which occurs
in TRS’s that rely only on the user direct experiences, be-
cause new users do not have any information about the
trustworthiness of the users in the system; the re-entry
problem, which points out the impossibility of establishing
the real identity of a user, allowing one user to create sev-
eral accounts in the system to favor one to another; finally,
the exit problem is the negative behavior of a user who is
planning to leave the social network, and who has no fur-
ther need for his good reputation. Most of them are diffi-
cult to totally avoid, so it is a good approach to try to
minimize their negative effects.
Some works analyze other threats for the robustness of
TRS’s. In [6,2] the threats against a TRS are classified
regarding the methods used in the attacks. They distin-
guish several types of attacks: self-promotion, where an at-
tacker manipulates its own reputation by falsely increasing
it; whitewashing, whose aim is to restore the reputation of
an attacker after been penalized by a TRS; slandering,
where a user votes against other users in order to decrease
their reputation; and orchestrated attacks, where a group of
users form a team to perform a coordinated attack.
Several threat models are presented in [11,12]. They
take the example of a P2P network for file sharing, in order
to explain the methods used by malicious users to achieve
their goal. In many senses, a social network can be viewed
as a P2P network, in terms of a decentralized network
where users can share and rate different resources (texts,
videos, images, etc.).
It is assumed that good users, in terms of trust and rep-
utation, will always be honest, so they will receive positive
links from the rest of good users. In this situation, the main
threat models to interfere in the overall ranking of trust
can be described as follows [11]:
 Threat Model A: Individual Malicious Peers. Malicious
users always present a bad behavior, so they receive
negative links from good users.
 Threat Model B: Malicious Collectives. Based on previous
model, adding the possibility of bad peers to assign
positive trust values to other malicious users. In this
way, the ranking of malicious users can be increased
due to the amount of positive in-links received.
 Threat Model C: Camouflage behind good transactions.
Malicious peers can cheat some good users to vote pos-
itively for them. The effect in the network is that some
bad users can sporadically receive a positive vote from a
good user.
 Threat Model D: Malicious spies. There are two types of
malicious users: some of them act as in threat model B
and C; and the others, called spies, who make good users
to vote positively for them, and assign positive trust val-
ues only to bad nodes.
 Threat Model E: Camouflage behind judgments. In this
model, malicious peers assign negative trust values to
good users. This strategy can cause the decrease of trust
for good peers and, as a consequence, the promotion of
the malicious peers in the ranking of trust.
2 www.kuro5hin.org/.3. Propagation of trust and distrust
In this section we introduce our proposal for the com-
putation of the trustworthiness of the users in an on-line
network by propagating their positive and negative opin-
ions. Our proposal takes as input a weighted directed
graph modeling a social network, where the nodes are
the users of the network and the edges represent the rela-
tions between those users. The weights of the edges con-
tain information about the type of the relation
established between two users. Given i and j, two users
of a social network, we define pij as the weight of the edge
from user i to user j. If pij is positive, it means that i is a fol-
lower of j. In other case, i would be a detractor of j.
In the remainder of this section we briefly explain
PolarityRank, a propagation algorithm introduced in
[13,14] to propagate positive and negative information
through a graph. Then, we present PolarityTrust, our trust
and reputation algorithm that adapts PolarityRank in order
to deal with the trust and reputation task, facing some
common vulnerabilities in TRS’s, such as the orchestrated
attacks and the dishonest votes [2].
3.1. PolarityRank
PolarityRank is based on the similar ideas as PageRank
[15], but it extends its functionalities in order to handle
graphs with positive and negative edges. PolarityRank de-
fines two different ranking values for each node in the graph,
Positive PolarityRank (PRþ) and Negative PolarityRank (PR).
Formally, let G ¼ ðV ; EÞ be a directed weighted graph with
the set of vertices V and the set of directed edges E. Given
two nodes, v i; v j 2 V , we define pij as a real valued attri-
bute that represents the weight of the edge from v i to v j,
with pij – 0. For a given vertex v i, let In
þðv iÞ and Inðv iÞ
be the sets of vertices that point to it (predecessors) with
positive and negative edges, respectively. And let Outðv iÞ
be the set of vertices that v i points to (successors). The
scores can be obtained as it is shown in Eqs. (2) and (3).
































where d is the damping factor that represents the probabil-
ity of choosing a neighbor of the current node in the next
step of the random-walk. eþ and e are the personalization
vectors. They are intended to compute a biased ranking
algorithm in which some nodes have higher probability
of being visited than others. Intuitively, these vectors rep-
resent the a priorirelevance of the nodes in the network.The propagation algorithm iterates over the nodes in
the network, applying the Eqs. (2) and (3). The process
ends when the maximum difference between the scores
in one iteration and the previous one, is lower than a given
threshold, t. The algebraic and convergence proofs of Polar-
ityRank are detailed in [13].
The basic idea behind PolarityRank is to classify the
nodes in a network into positive and negative, regarding
their relationships to a set of known positive and negative
nodes, namely seeds. The algorithm is intended to propa-
gate the information of these seeds to the rest of the nodes
through the edges of the graph, in such way that the nodes
are influenced by their closeness to positive or negative
seeds.
Apart from the ability to process a graph with positive
and negative relationships between its nodes, we have
chosen PolarityRank as the basis of our system due to its
flexibility when it comes to enrich the algorithm with suit-
able elements for the task of computing the reputation of
users in a social network.
3.2. Our proposal
In this section we present our proposal, an adaptation of
the ideas behind PolarityRank, intended to deal with the
problem of estimating the trustworthiness of the users in
a social network. In this case, the graph is built taking
the users of the network as the nodes of the graph, the
edges representing the opinions of some users about oth-
ers, and the weights of the edges corresponding to the
intensity of the relationship between the nodes. This inten-
sity of the relations can be measured in different ways,
depending on the type of social network that we are pro-
cessing. For example, in an on-line marketplace (such as
eBay.com), the weight of an edge, pij, can be an aggregation
of all the opinions of user i about user j, computed as the
difference between the amount of satisfactory and unsatis-
factory transactions between these two users.
PolarityTrust computes an algorithm similar to Polari-
tyRank in order to obtain two scores for each user: the first
one representing the positive reputation of the user (PRþ),
and the other one representing the negative reputation





where 1 6 TrustðiÞ 6 þ1, being 1 the maximum distrust
value and þ1 the maximum trust value, corresponding to a
totally untrustworthy and a totally trustworthy user,
respectively.
As mentioned above, some social networks establish a
group of authorities or moderators (Slashdot, Kuro5hin2).
The opinions of these users are more relevant than the opin-
ions from the rest of users. In our system, we can take into
account this fact by considering a special group of nodes as
sources of trust. The intuition behind this concept is that the
opinions from these users must be propagated over the
Fig. 2. Transitivity model adopted by the Non-Negative Propagation
approach. Dashed lines corresponds to negative opinions, while thick
lines are positive votes, and the thin solid ones are undetermined
relations.network with more strength than the opinions from the rest
of the users. In this way, their opinions can be more influen-
tial in the propagation algorithm than the opinions from the
rest of users in the network. This intuition is included in our
algorithm using the vector eþ, which contains a score for each








where Sourcesþ is the set of users taken as sources of trust.
This intuition can be extended in order to obtain a set of
sources of distrust, who can provoke in the algorithm the
opposite effect of the sources of trust. In this way, the rep-
utation of the users who are positively linked from a source
of distrust, u, must be decreased, because the distrust score
of u is propagated to them. Analogously to the previous ap-
proach, the users that are taken as sources of distrust, have
an a priori score in the vector e.
This model implements as trust and distrust transitivity
model the multiplicative distrust assumption: ‘‘The enemy
of my enemy is my friend’’, graphically represented in
Fig. 1(1). So a node i gains high trust score in two cases,
when:
1. A highly trusted node votes positively for i, because the
high trustworthiness score of the voting node increases
the trust score of i. In other words, node i is related to a
trustworthy user, so it must be considered trustworthy
as well.
2. A highly distrusted node votes negatively for i, because
the inverse relation between both nodes makes the high
untrustworthiness of the voting node rise the trustwor-
thiness of i. This situation can be caused by the fact that
node i has an opposite position (opinion) of an untrust-
worthy user, so it must be taken as a trustworthy user.
Analogously, a node i gains high distrust score if:
1. A highly trusted node votes negatively for i, because the
inverse relation between the nodes transforms the high
trust score of the voting node into a high distrust score
for the target.
2. A highly distrusted node votes positively for i, because
node i is considered to be closely related to an untrust-
worthy user.
Furthermore, PolarityTrust includes two mechanisms,
Non-Negative Propagation and Action–Reaction Propagation,
intended to specifically deal with the problem of trust
and reputation in social networks. We discuss them in
depth in next sections.
3.2.1. Non-Negative Propagation (PRNN)
It has been shown in Section 2 that malicious users have
many ways to take advantage of the weaknesses in the
trust and reputation algorithms. In order to avoid the influ-
ence of bad nodes in the final ranking, we integrate in the
PolarityTrust algorithm the capability of deciding whether
the opinion of the users will be taken into account or not.Thus we can minimize the influence of malicious peers in
the ranking by allowing only some users to propagate their
opinions over the network. In this case, we adopt an hybrid
model for the transitivity of distrust, graphically explained
in Fig. 2. We avoid the propagation of negative opinions
from bad users, so they cannot harm the trust scores of
good users. This feature can help the system to deal with
possible attacks based on the use of negative votes, such
as the threat model E. As it is shown in the figure, if user
a distrusts b and b trusts d, then a distrusts d (multiplica-
tive distrust), but if b distrusts c; a does not take this opin-
ion into account (neutral distrust).
The positive opinions from bad users are already in-
cluded in the basic mechanism of PolarityTrust, taking this
information into account depending on the target of the
links. In this way, Non-Negative propagation approach
aims to protect the global ranking from some actions of
malicious users, because their negative opinions will not
be propagated.
Given the scores PRþ and PR, we can dynamically clas-
sify a user, v i, as good or bad by checking the sign of
Trustðv iÞ, as follows:
Signðv iÞ ¼
1 Trustðv iÞ < 0
1 otherwise

So, the basic PolarityRank with the addition of Non-Nega-
tive propagation is computed as it is shown in the Eqs.
(4) and (5).
































This mechanism allows PolarityTrust to take a node as
good or bad, depending on the scores obtained in each iter-
ation of the algorithm. It means that, in a given iteration t,
we can take node i as a bad user (and consequently do not
propagate its opinions), and the next iteration, t þ 1, the
same node could be taken as a good user due to the scores
of its neighbors in that iteration.
(1) (2)
Fig. 3. Action–Reaction against incoherent judgments: node b is a
malicious user, node c is a positive one, and node a is a dishonest user
voting them. Dashed lines corresponds to negative opinions, while thick
lines are positive votes. AR Propagation creates a negative vote from
nodes b and c to node a, in order to penalize its incoherent judgments.3.2.2. Action–Reaction Propagation (PRAR)
The main aspect of the behavior of malicious users is
the set of relations that they establish, intended to gain
some kind of benefits in terms of good reputation in the
network. Most of the attacks that these users perform
against a TRS consist in providing incoherent votes to other
users in the network. In this section we explain the last
extension of our TRS, that addresses the dishonest voting
problem. This vulnerability is based on the concept of mali-
cious spies that are users who seem to be good but only as-
sign positive trust values to malicious peers. This kind of
attacks can be blocked by studying the coherence or inco-
herence of the opinions in the network. This problem is
called Dishonesty in [11], defining as Positive Dishonesty
the situation in which a user assesses positively malicious
peers, and analogously for Negative Dishonesty.
Action–Reaction Propagation is the method that we
propose to deal with Dishonesty. It is graphically explained
in Fig. 3. It consists in penalizing those users who have
incoherent judgments, namely dishonest users, by the dy-
namic inclusion of virtual negative votes against incoher-
ent opinions. In order to judge a vote as dishonest or not,
we define the polarity of the edge from node i to node j as:
Polarityði; jÞ ¼
1 pij < 0
1 otherwise

where pij is the weight of the edge from i to j. The penali-
zation depends on the level of dishonesty of each user, in
other words, the total number of incoherent judgments.






where SignðjÞ – Polarityði; jÞ is true if node i assigns a positive
vote to a negative node, or if it assigns a negative vote to a
positive node. This penalization only affects the negative
score of each node. The formula for PRþ is the same discussed
















ð7ÞNote that the AR model does not reward the coherent
votes, but penalizes the incoherent ones. This observation
is important due to the possibility of an attack consisting
in a variation of threat model E, in which malicious users
vote negatively for good users. If the coherent votes are re-
warded, a malicious user could gain high reputation by
voting positively for good users. This approach also avoids
this possibility by only penalizing the incoherent votes.3.2.3. PolarityTrust
Our proposal, PolarityTrust, combines both extensions,
Non-Negative Propagation and Action–Reaction Propaga-
tion, in order to take advantage of their ideas. In this
way, the opinions of bad users are not propagated to their
neighbors, and all the nodes with a dishonest behavior are
penalized in the ranking of trust. This combined model fol-
low the Eqs. (8) and (9).


































The experiments in this work are designed to evaluate
the reliability of our proposal. With this aim, we detail in
this section the configuration, datasets and evaluation
metrics applied.
Regarding the two parameters of PolarityTrust algo-
rithm, we have set d to 0.85, the common value used in
most of the papers about PageRank and similar algorithms;
and the error threshold has been set to 0.001.
In the reminder of this section, we present the datasets
used in this work, consisting in a set of randomly gener-
ated graphs (Section 4.1) and a real-world dataset ex-
tracted from Slashdot.org, a social news site (Section 4.2).
The graph models built from these datasets contain nodes
representing the users in the social network and a set of
edges representing the relationships between those users.
In the case of the randomly generated graph models, the
weights of these edges represent the aggregation of (posi-
tive and negative) opinions of the users. In the dataset from
Slashdot.org we have two possible weights for a given
edge, pij : 1 if i has tagged j as a friend, or 1 in the other
case.
In Section 4.3 we explain the additional methods used in
the experiments to compare the results. Finally, in Section
4.4 we briefly discuss the metrics used for the evaluation of
the experimental results.
4.1. Graph generation
We use a method to randomly generate graphs with a
topology similar to real-world networks. These methods
are frequently used in works on network analysis [4,5]
due to the difficulty in obtaining datasets from the real
world, and also the necessity of creating random networks
in order to study the behavior and mechanisms produced
in the real ones.
One of the most cited studies on large real-world net-
works is presented in [16]. This work introduces a method
for the generation of random graphs that models real-
world networks. The main aspect of these graphs is that
they present the preferential attachment property. It con-
sists in the fact that the new users of a network attach pref-
erentially to nodes that are already well connected. The
work also introduces the Barabasi method, intended to
generate graphs with this property. We use this method
to generate the datasets for our experiments. The method
begins with a network of at least two nodes, and the degree
of each node should be at least 1, in order to generate a
connected network. New nodes are added to the network
one at a time. Each new node is connected to a number




where ki is the out-degree of node i. In this way, the de-
grees follow a power-law distribution and the network
shows the preferential attachment property.
Since we want to determine the performance of our
proposal against different types of malicious behaviors,
we need to generate a graph model for each attack. The
Barabasi method is implemented to generate the nodes
and edges modeling the good user behaviors. For the
experiments, we have generated graphs with 104 nodes.
Once the basic graph is generated modeling the behaviors
of good users in a social network, we add the malicious
users and their relations. The nodes and edges of malicious
users are generated according to each attack. Given a ran-
domly generated graph, we add the malicious nodes and
create the negative links from good users to them regard-
ing the intensity of threat model A. Then the edges that
will form the desired attacks are created with a certain
probability, depending on the intensity of each attack:
the more intense a threat model is required to be, the more
probable the creation of an edge modeling this attack.
4.2. Slashdot Zoo dataset
In addition to this randomly generated datasets, we
have tested our proposal against a real-world dataset,
namely Slashdot Zoo, presented in [10]. It is a crawling of
the Slashdot.org network that is a social network founded
in 1997, focused on the publication, recommendation and
discussion of news mainly related to technology. The
Slashdot.org system provides the users with the ability ofestablishing two types of relationships: friend (positive
link) or foe (negative link). In the beginning, Slashdot
established a group of 25 moderators. This amount was in-
creased to 400 due to the growth in the number of users.
Nowadays, the moderator team is automatically selected.
The Slashdot TRS consists in three layers: the first one is
for rating the content of the network (comments and arti-
cles), while the second one moderates the raters. In addi-
tion, Slashdot staff members are able to moderate any
element in the system (comments, articles and
participants).
The dataset crawled in [10] is formed by the users in the
system and their friend-or-foe relations. It contains about
71500 users and more than 510K = 510,000 edges, being
24% negative links. The gold standard is given by a special
user, called NoMoreTrolls, who has all the known trolls of
Slashdot in its list of foes. Since we want to follow the same
experimental settings of [10], we have considered the
same set of 96 trolls.
4.3. Additionally implemented methods
In this section we present the techniques taken as base-
lines in the experiments (EigenTrust and Fans Minus
Freaks) as well as two more sophisticated methods (Signed
Spectral Ranking and Negative Ranking) that, like our pro-
posal, use positive and negative links to compute trust
values.
The first baseline method is the EigenTrust algorithm
[12]. It aims to reduce the number of inauthentic file
downloads in a P2P network. In the EigenTrust algorithm,
each user calculates the local trust value for all peers vot-
ing to him. The global trust value is obtained by aggregat-
ing the normalized local trust values with respect to a peer.
Formally, given C, a matrix where cij represents the opinion
of i about j (local trust value), the EigenTrust algorithm
computes the global trust values as:
ti ¼ CTcij
where ti is the vector of local trust values of i for each node
in the network. Repeating this process, ti will converge to a
stable value, t, that is the vector containing the EigenTrust
values for each node. This vector is the left principal eigen-
vector of the matrix C.
The second baseline is the heuristic Fans Minus Freaks. It
is a simple metric that relies only in the direct experience
of the users, taking into consideration the detractors and
followers of each one to compute its score. The trust score
of node v i is the difference between the number of positive
and negative links pointing to i, obtained as follows:
FmFðv iÞ ¼ jInþðv iÞj  jInðv iÞj
Finally, we have implemented the two methods pro-
posed in [10], Signed Spectral Ranking (SR) and Negative
Ranking (NR). The first one is a popularity measure consist-
ing in applying PageRank algorithm directly to the graph,
including negative edges. Negative Ranking includes both
PageRank and SR in the computation, it is defined as
follows:
NR ¼ SR b  PR
Table 1
Error rate for each technique against incremental attacks: EigenTrust (ET),
Fans Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral Ranking (SR), Negative Ranking
(NR), Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN), Action–Reaction
approach (PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT). For the attacks including the model
D, we insert 100 spy nodes in the graph. The best results for each
experiment are highlighted in bold.
Threats ET FmF SR NR PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.535 0.446 0.354 0.271 0.265 0.175 0.087
A, B 0.535 0.446 0.355 0.272 0.265 0.175 0.087
A, B, C 0.526 0.649 0.345 0.272 0.256 0.166 0.106
A, B, C, D 0.528 0.650 0.344 0.272 0.255 0.166 0.116
A, B, C,
D, E
0.527 0.527 0.345 0.282 0.261 0.169 0.110where b P 0 determines the influence of PageRank on the
final ranking. In [10], the best results are achieved by set-
ting b ¼ 1, so it is done in these experiments.
Unlike this method, in our proposal both positive and
negative links are propagated in such way that they influ-
ence both positive and negative scores of the users, being
able to implement the transitivity of trust and distrust in
a social network.
4.4. Evaluation metrics
Since the aim of these techniques is to demote the bad
users in the ranking and to promote the good ones, we use
the number of inversions as one of the evaluation metrics. In
other words, we evaluate the performance of the tech-
niques in terms of the number of bad users that appear
in the positions of the ranking corresponding to good users.
The lower the metric value, the better is the performance
of the technique. In order to make the results comparable,
we normalize this metric obtaining the error rate of each
technique, computed as follows:
ErrorRate ¼ NumberOfInversions
TotalNumberOfBadUsers
On the other hand, we have included in the evaluation
of the experiments the standard nDCG (Normalized Dis-
counted Cumulative Gain) [17]. In this way, we do not only
evaluate the fact of avoiding bad users in top positions, but
also the specific ranking achieved by these malicious users.








where p is the given position of the ranking, relevance ¼ 1
if a user is good, and 0 if not. Finally, IDCG is the Ideal Dis-
counted Cumulative Gain, that is the best DCG that can be
obtained for the given dataset. In our case, we have evalu-
ated the positions of the bad users in the ranking, penaliz-
ing the results where good users have low positions.
5. Experimental results
In this section we present the results of the experiments
performed following the settings explained above. First, in
Section 5.1 we test our proposal against an incremental
combination of the basic attacks reviewed in Section 2.
We also show the performance of our approaches with a
real-world social network using the Slashdot Zoo dataset
(Section 5.2). Then, in Section 5.3, we test our proposal
with a combination of a real and synthetic data, by modi-
fying the Slashdot Zoo dataset in such way that the tagged
trolls perform the attack models introduced in Section 2.
Finally, we present in Section 5.4 some experiments in-
tended to test the usefulness of the inclusion of the sources
of distrust in our algorithm.
5.1. Basic attack models
The first set of experiments is intended to show the
performance of our approaches against the basic attacksexplained in Section 2, and incremental combinations of
them. In these experiments, we have generated graphs
with 103 malicious users. These nodes receive negatives
votes from the good users with a probability of 0.8 (inten-
sity of threat A). The intensity of threat model B has been
set to 100%, meaning that every bad node votes positively
for the rest of malicious users in the graph. Model C inten-
sity has been set to 25%, given that a value near 50% or
higher will transform any bad node into a good one. Final-
ly, the 50% of the bad nodes vote negatively for good users,
performing the model E. With these parameters, the result-
ing graphs have about 105 edges, of which 25% are negative
links. The graphs implementing the threat model D addi-
tionally have 100 spy nodes. Finally, we have used 10
nodes as sources of trust for all the experiments.
The error rate for each technique is shown in Table 1
where we can see that our system obtains very good re-
sults, improving EigenTrust and Fans-Minus-Freaks. SR
and NR results are between PT and PT + AR, improving Eig-
enTrust and FmF as well. This fact shows the relevance of
using the negative links in the computation of trust.
In Table 2 we show the nDCG, measuring the demotion of
bad users in the ranking of trust. In this case, both extensions
Non-Negative and Action-Reaction propagation present
better performance than the baselines, while the complete
technique is the best method in accordance to these results.
5.2. Slashdot dataset experiments
Up to this point we have performed experiments with a
set of randomly generated datasets, using the Barabasi and
Albert generation method in order to obtain graphs that
model real-world networks. In this section we show the re-
sults of our proposals on a real-world dataset: the Slashdot
Zoo (see Section 4.2). The results of each technique have
been evaluated using the error rate and the nDCG. In both
cases we have evaluated the number of bad users in posi-
tions above the last 96 of the ranking. In Table 3 we show
the results.
For these experiments, the set of sources of trust is
formed by the user CmdrTaco, corresponding to the foun-
der of Slashdot.org Rob Malda, and the users that he has
tagged as friends. There are 6 sources of trust in total.
We show the results of these experiments in Table 3.
The scores in the error rate for every technique are higher
than those in previous section due to the proportion of bad
nodes in the Slashdot Zoo dataset (0.0013) in contrast to
Table 2
nDCG for each technique against incremental attacks: EigenTrust (ET), Fans
Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral Ranking (SR), Negative Ranking (NR),
Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN), Action–Reaction approach
(PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT). For the attacks including the model D, we
insert 100 spy nodes in the graph. The best results for each experiment are
highlighted in bold.
Threats ET FmF SR NR PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.833 0.843 0.599 0.749 0.876 0.906 0.987
A, B 0.833 0.844 0.811 0.920 0.876 0.906 0.987
A, B, C 0.842 0.719 0.816 0.920 0.877 0.903 0.984
A, B, C, D 0.823 0.723 0.818 0.937 0.879 0.903 0.984
A, B, C,
D, E
0.753 0.777 0.877 0.933 0.966 0.862 0.982
Table 4
Error rate for each technique processing the Slashdot Zoo dataset with
synthetic attacks: EigenTrust (ET), Fans Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral
Ranking (SR), Negative Ranking (NR), Non-Negative propagation approach
(PRNN), Action–Reaction approach (PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT). For the
attacks including the model D, we insert 100 spy nodes in the graph. The
best results for each experiment are highlighted in bold.
Threats ET FmF SR NR PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.990 0.901 0.881 0.881 0.861 0.861 0.861
A, B 1.000 0.901 0.880 0.880 0.861 0.861 0.861
A, B, C 1.000 0.901 0.881 0.881 0.861 0.861 0.861
A, B, C, D 1.000 0.925 0.935 0.940 0.851 0.856 0.841
A, B, C,
D, E
1.000 0.925 0.940 0.935 0.851 0.856 0.841
Table 5
nDCG for each technique processing the Slashdot Zoo dataset with synthetic
attacks: EigenTrust (ET), Fans Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral Ranking
(SR), Negative Ranking (NR), Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN),
Action–Reaction approach (PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT). For the attacks
including the model D, we insert 100 spy nodes in the graph. The best
results for each experiment are highlighted in bold.
Threats ET FmF SR NR PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.310 0.460 0.479 0.477 0.593 0.570 0.588
A, B 0.308 0.460 0.478 0.477 0.593 0.570 0.588
A, B, C 0.311 0.460 0.474 0.484 0.593 0.570 0.588the randomly generated datasets of previous section (10%).
In this case, nDCG is a more appropriate metric to compare
the techniques because their values are normalized.
In accordance with the data in Table 3, EigenTrust algo-
rithm does not demote any of the 96 trolls in the last posi-
tions of the ranking, while FmF and SR perform slightly
better and NR gets a very good result. Finally, our ap-
proaches outperform NR, presenting the best performance
with this dataset, achieving a 10% of improvement over the
rest of methods. This experiment highlights the usefulness
of our proposal in a real environment.A, B, C, D 0.370 0.476 0.501 0.501 0.580 0.570 0.586
A, B, C,
D, E
0.370 0.475 0.501 0.496 0.580 0.574 0.588
Table 6
Error rate for our approaches using some known trolls as sources of
distrust, taking as input the Slashdot Zoo dataset with synthetic attacks.
Results for Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN), Action–Reaction
approach (PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT) using sources of trust only, and
sources of trust and distrust. The best results for each experiment are
highlighted in bold.
Threats Sources of trust Sources of trust & distrust
PRNN PRAR PT PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.475 0.505 0.465
A,B 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.475 0.505 0.465
A,B,C 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.475 0.505 0.465
A,B,C,D 0.851 0.856 0.841 0.657 0.677 0.642
A,B,C,D,E 0.851 0.856 0.841 0.652 0.677 0.637
Table 7
nDCG for our approaches using some known trolls as sources of distrust,
taking as input the Slashdot Zoo dataset with synthetic attacks. Results for5.3. Trolling Slashdot Zoo dataset
In this section we adopt the role of trolls in Slashdot.org.
We try to perform some attacks against the network
through the 96 tagged trolls in the Slashdot Zoo dataset.
In this way, we can measure the impact of the different
trolling techniques discussed in Section 2, and compare
the behavior of the implemented techniques.
In order to create the datasets for these experiments we
apply the same mechanism explained in Section 4.1 for the
generation of bad users and their out-links and in-links. In-
stead of taking a randomly generated graph as the network
under attack, we have used the Slashdot Zoo dataset. The
different attacks have been applied to this graph by adding
a number of edges modeling the required behavior of the
bad nodes. No new nodes have been added to the original
dataset, so the amount of good and bad users is the same as
in previous experiments.
The experiments are evaluated applying the same met-
rics previously mentioned. In Table 4 we present the values
of the rate of errors for each technique against each threat
model, counting the number of good users that appear in
the last positions of the rankings. We can see that theTable 3
nDCG and error rate for each technique processing Slashdot Zoo dataset.
EigenTrust (ET), Fans Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral Ranking (SR),
Negative Ranking (NR), Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN), Action–
Reaction approach (PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT). The best results for each
experiment are highlighted in bold.
ET FmF SR NR PRNN PRAR PT
Error % 0.990 0.901 0.881 0.881 0.861 0.861 0.861
nDCG 0.310 0.460 0.479 0.477 0.593 0.570 0.588
Non-Negative propagation approach (PRNN), Action–Reaction approach
(PRAR) and PolarityTrust (PT) using sources of trust only, and sources of
trust and distrust. The best results for each experiment are highlighted in
bold.
Threats Sources of trust Sources of trust & distrust
PRNN PRAR PT PRNN PRAR PT
A 0.593 0.570 0.588 0.846 0.790 0.846
A, B 0.593 0.570 0.588 0.846 0.790 0.846
A, B, C 0.593 0.570 0.588 0.846 0.790 0.846
A, B, C, D 0.580 0.570 0.586 0.775 0.739 0.782
A, B, C, D, E 0.580 0.574 0.588 0.774 0.741 0.781
Fig. 4. Error rate and nDCG results obtained by all the techniques processing a network under a combination of all the reviewed attacks. EigenTrust (ET),
Fans Minus Freaks (FmF), Signed Spectral Ranking (SR), Negative Ranking (NR), Non-Negative propagation approach (PRnn), Action–Reaction approach
(PRar) and PolarityTrust (PT). The results of PolarityTrust with and without negative sources are represented in the chart.addition of the attacks provoke an increasing number of er-
rors using any of the studied methods but our proposals,
which performance remains reasonably stable.
Regarding the positions where bad users are placed in
the ranking, we show in Table 5 the nDCG values for each
experiment. The results of our methods achieve an
improvement of about 10% over the rest of techniques. It
means that the misclassified bad users are demoted in
the ranking so their ranks, according to our approaches,
are lower than the ones computed by the other methods.5.4. Experiments with sources of distrust
All the experiments presented below have been per-
formed with a set of sources of trust, and no sources of dis-
trust. In this section we test this feature by taking as input
the same datasets of previous section, the Slashdot Zoo
with the addition of synthetic attacks. As long as we just
try to test whether this feature can be useful in our sche-
ma, we have randomly chosen 5 known trolls (foes of the
special user No More Trolls) as sources of distrust, without
following any specific heuristic.
The results of our approaches with the inclusion of the
sources of distrust are shown in Tables 6 and 7, corre-
sponding to the error rate and the nDCG, respectively.
For better understanding, we include in these tables also
the scores of the techniques using only sources of trust.
The improvement achieved by all the approaches in
relation to the same techniques without the sources of dis-
trust is evident, outperforming all the previous results. In
Fig. 4 we show the results of all the techniques dealing
with the combination of all the reviewed attacks.Regarding these results, this feature can be very useful
in a system where some malicious users have been identi-
fied, penalizing those users who interact with them (creat-
ing a positive edge to any of them, for example). It can be
also applicable together with some simple mechanisms
that help to (vaguely) identify users who can be considered
a priori as bad users according to their links, their com-
ments or their behavior in general.6. Conclusions
In this work we have presented PolarityTrust, a Trust
and Reputation System based on the propagation of the po-
sitive and negative opinions of the users in a social network
in order to compute their trustworthiness. Our proposal
uses this information in order to obtain two scores: a posi-
tive one indicating the goodness of a user, and a negative
one corresponding to its badness. Unlike other approaches,
in our method positive and negative links influence both
positive and negative scores, being able to implement the
transitivity of trust and distrust in a social network.
The reliability of PolarityTrust has been proved by test-
ing its behavior under some common attacks against TRS’s,
and also with a real-world dataset from the social news
site Slashdot.org. The attacks consist in dishonest behav-
iors of malicious users who can take advantage of the vul-
nerabilities of a TRS in order to gain a high reputation in
the network. We have also introduced a extension to the
basic model of PolarityTrust intended to penalize those
users who present a dishonest behavior, according to the
intensity of this behavior. The experiments on synthetic
datasets show that the performances of our approaches
are not affected by the implemented attacks, clearly out-
performing the results of other systems. Finally, the exper-
iments with the Slashdot Zoo dataset shows the reliability
of PolarityTrust in a real-world social network, even when
a few new edges are added in order to perform a set of
more sophisticated attacks against the network.
The concept of sources of trust allows to include in our
TRS the different levels of users existing in social networks
(administrators, moderators, normal users, etc.). With
PolarityTrust we can easily assign different weights to
the opinions of the users regarding their category in the
network. Otherwise, the use of sources of trust and distrust
have proved to be a highly reliable method. It could be use-
ful in a semi-supervised schema, serving as an assisting
tool for experts or moderators who would only have to as-
sess the (un-) trustworthiness of a small amount of users
and delegating the rest of the process to our system.
We plan to further our research by studying other types
of attacks against TRS’s, including the use of playbook se-
quences [8], consisting in a sequence of actions intended
to gain high trustworthiness. There is an infinite set of pos-
sible playbook sequences, and they can be influenced by
other users playbooks, making this attacks really hard to de-
tect and to avoid. The intuition behind playbook attacks is
that it cannot be assessed that a TRS is effective just because
the potential attackers do not know how it works. It is also
interesting to test some methods for the selection of sources
of distrust in the system, such as link-based heuristics.References
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